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Abstract  
The distribution of wealth is widening in many countries and with it the importance of 
inherited wealth. In 1974 a Labour Government came to power in the United Kingdom 
committed to introducing an annual wealth tax. It left office without doing so. Using the 
official archives of the time and those of a key advisor this paper traces both the origins 
of the policy and its fate at the hands of the civil service. It explores two related 
questions. What does this experience tell us about the role of the civil service in the 
policy process in the UK and what lessons might be learned by those wishing to tackle 
the issue of widening wealth disparities today?     
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 Wealth and the policy process 
 
Two distinct but linked concerns provoked this paper. One was the revived interest in the 
distribution of wealth as a policy issue internationally and the second the fact that over 
thirty years ago a United Kingdom government came to office promising to redistribute 
wealth by introducing an annual tax on major holders of wealth. It gave up the attempt. 
The National Archives that cover this period are now open for study offering an 
opportunity to examine why this happened.   
The renewed interest in wealth and its distribution has been sparked by new evidence. A 
growing concentration of wealth has been reported in several advanced economies after 
many decades of equalisation. The relative importance of inherited wealth, compared to 
wealth amassed over a lifetime, has also begun to grow recently in countries for which 
we have good long term data (Roine and Waldestrom 2009). In France, which has 
uniquely good information on individual wealth over time, there was a striking decline in 
the concentration of wealth and in the importance of inheritance from 1914 to 1945. That 
trend ended in the 1980s and since then has reversed sharply (Piketty 2011). With lower 
economic and demographic growth Piketty predicts that:    
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 ‘inheritance will eventually matter a lot pretty much everywhere - as it did in 
ancient societies. Past wealth will tend to dominate new wealth, and successors will tend 
to dominate labor earners’. (p42) 
 
Wealth is spread far more unequally than income in most countries (OECD 2008; 
National Equality Panel 2010). Yet, taxes on annual net wealth have been systematically 
abandoned in most OECD countries in the past two decades (OECD 2010). In 2010 the 
Coalition Government in the United Kingdom repealed the previous government’s 
meagre but innovative attempt to redistribute wealth in favour of poor families – the 
Child Trust Fund. This scheme had been part of what advocates saw as a new social 
policy strategy – asset based welfare or giving the poor greater access to capital (Paxton 
and White 2006). A major independent review of the United Kingdom tax system has 
recently suggested that government should consider taxing wealth more effectively on 
efficiency as well as equity grounds (Mirlees Review 2011).  
Beyond these ‘advanced economy’ debates a wider question has been posed. If rights to 
life and liberty are being denied because of extreme poverty in some parts of the world 
may that not justify a levy on the wealth enjoyed by the people of rich nations if that can 
help relieve such destitution (Pogge 2007)?   
The last time a government was elected in the United Kingdom with a promise to 
introduce an annual tax on wealth it failed to keep that promise. This experience prompts 
several questions. Why was such a promise made? Why did the government abandon the 
idea? Why did the Labour Government of 1974-6 fail to adopt a different and possibly 
more practical means of redistributing wealth that was then on offer? What might future 
policy makers learn from this experience?  
These questions lead onto a second and wider reflection on the policy process. Texts on 
the subject (Levin, 1997; Hall 1993; Kingdon, 1984; 2003; Bochel and Bochel 2003) and 
individual case studies (Hall, Land, Parker and Webb 1975; Dunleavy 1981; Butler 1992) 
tend to focus on achieved change. What interest groups, power brokers, historical 
contingencies, past policy decisions or key research findings contributed to a new policy 
or institutional creation? Rarely do scholars ask - what prevented change from 
happening? There is a tradition of writing about ‘non policy making’ (Lukes 1974; 
Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Crenson 1971; Newby 1978) which discusses why some 
issues fail to get onto political agendas. There are studies of policies that fail after being 
legislated. The poll tax is one example (Butler, Adonis and Travers, 1994). But 
governments do, from time to time, gear themselves for action and then retreat. This is 
less studied but may be just as revealing of the policy process. What can the retreat on 
wealth tax policy between 1974 and 1976 contribute to that discussion? 
 
          Taxing wealth  
In the early part of the twentieth century modest annual taxes on wealth were introduced 
in Scandinavia and then in other European countries. India followed in 1957. France had 
taxed transfers of wealth and regulated inheritance ever since 1791 but in 1981 
introduced an additional graduated annual ‘solidarity tax’. In the past two decades, 
however, annual taxes on wealth have been largely abandoned across Europe. Austria, 
Denmark and Germany abandoned them in 1997, Finland, Iceland and Luxembourg in 
2006, Sweden in 2007 and Spain in 2008.  
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The precipitating reasons have differed. The tax was declared unconstitutional in 
Germany because of lack of clarity about the rationale underpinning its valuations of 
wealth. In Spain the government recently reduced taxes on property to compensate for the 
impact of the banking crisis. The French tax is under review and may be abolished 
because of its unpopularity and complexity. Wealth taxes survive in Switzerland, the 
Netherlands and Norway. In the United States the Estates Tax (‘death tax’) was being 
phased out and was to attract only a zero rate in 2000 (Graetz and Shapiro 2005). A 
positive tax rate was reintroduced under President Obama but levied at a lower rate than 
it had been originally. Everywhere, however, the growing international mobility of 
capital has worried governments and constrained wealth tax policies.        
In his study of contemporary British history Harrison (2010) takes the failure of the 
Labour Government to pass its promised wealth tax in 1974-6 as an early example of the 
fight back by the landowning and middle classes against growing trade union power and 
the drive for social equality. This counter attack continued through the 1980s under Mrs 
Thatcher’s premiership. But the landowning class’ success in defeating the wealth tax, he 
argues, began a revival of landed wealth. A close reading of the government archives 
suggests a rather more nuanced interpretation of these events in which the role of the 
Treasury and weaknesses in Labour’s policy design play a part.   
 
 
             1974-9 – a post war break point 
It is true that this period saw a significant change in the political and economic climate. 
In 1976 the Labour Government had to call on the International Monetary Fund to rescue 
it from a major run on the pound. An unsustainable level of inflation was linked to public 
expenditure growth unmatched by likely revenue. The steady expansion of social 
spending that had taken place since the Second World War was checked. Trade union 
power reached its peak in 1974. Over half of the employed population were members of 
trade unions. By 2010 the comparable figure was just over a quarter and only15 per cent 
in the private sector.  Unions were powerful not just within particular industries but had 
the capacity to shape economic policy. Provoking a recession to check wage inflation was 
still seen as an unacceptable strategy, so negotiation and compromise with the trade union 
movement were deemed a necessary strategy by both major parties. The National Union 
of Miners engaged in a battle against the government’s wages policy that resulted in a 
three day working week and electoral defeat for the Conservative Government in 
February 1974. Inflation was to rise by more than 20 per cent and wages by more than a 
quarter during 1974-5.   
To win trade union agreement to some kind of wage restraint the Labour Party agreed, 
before the election, to introduce a range of measures that would ‘fundamentally 
redistribute income and wealth’. Social policy legislation was to include increases in 
pensions, a new child benefit, reductions in public housing rents and a new annual tax on 
wealth. It is clear from the memoirs of some of those involved at the time that the trade 
unions had the upper hand in determining the content of this ‘social contract’ (Barnett 
1982; Donoughue 2006). The Permanent Secretary to the Treasury at the time has argued 
that the whole shape of Labour’s economic policy during that period was set in the deal 
done with the TUC in 1973/4 (Wass 2008). It is some measure of the balance of power at 
the time that Barbara Castle, the Secretary of State for health and pension policy, was 
4 
 
unable to announce her plans to the Parliamentary Labour Party in early 1974– attending 
a TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee had to take precedence (Castle 1980).  
When the crisis came to a head in late 1976 the IMF required major cuts in public 
spending in order to give its support. Cuts were agreed to after an initial defeat in 
Parliament caused by a rebellion of Labour back bench members. The new Prime 
Minister Callaghan and the Chancellor Healey drove through a modified package of cuts 
after a two day debate in Cabinet recorded in Tony Benn’s diaries (Benn 1989 pp 661-
88). In the longer term the Treasury was able to impose a new ‘cash limits’ regime 
controlling future spending plans (Thain and Wright 1995) and a post Keynesian 
framework for economic policy.    
The experience of these years decided Mrs Thatcher and Sir Keith Joseph, her ideological 
mentor, that Conservatism had to change fundamentally (Thatcher 1995; Joseph 1976). 
Trade union power must be challenged and defeated. Creeping state expansion had to be 
reversed. In short, the politics of the post war period changed for good (Marquand 2008; 
Harrison 2010). It is against this background that the debate about taxing wealth took 
place in 1974. It was a debate that had a long history.             
 
               The origins of the idea of an annual wealth tax for the UK 
The practice of taxing the transfer of estates at death in the UK began, in a coherent way, 
in 1894. Though initially modest the top tax rate rose significantly over time. In 1894 the 
very largest estates attracted a tax of 7.5 per cent. By 1930 that had risen to nearly 40 per 
cent. After the Second World War it rose to 65 per cent. In 1949 Sir Stafford Cripps the 
Labour Chancellor raised the top rate to 75 per cent. However, the tax collected relatively 
little revenue as people found increasingly ingenious ways to avoid it, notably by giving 
assets away before death. In the mid 1960s revenue from death duties only amounted to 
0.6 per cent of total personal wealth. (Atkinson 1972). Failure to tax wealth more 
effectively began to exercise some in the Labour Party after it went into opposition in 
1951. A coherent alternative tax strategy began to emerge only slowly, however. The key 
figure was Nicholas Kaldor, then Reader in Economics at Cambridge University. He was 
concerned about the then high marginal rates of income tax and their impact on work 
incentives. But he was also concerned about the inequity of a system that took no account 
of an individual’s assets in assessing capacity to pay tax. In his papers for the Fabian Tax 
Group in 1951/2 he recommended imposing an annual wealth tax as a replacement for 
‘surtax’ -the additional tax on high earners (Kings College Cambridge: Kaldor papers: 
NK/1-17).  
Before leaving office in 1951 the Labour Government appointed a Royal 
Commission to review tax policy especially as it related to personal incomes and taxes on 
businesses. Its terms of reference were changed slightly by the incoming Conservative 
Administration to permit it to recommend reductions in revenue from these sources. As 
part of its remit it discussed whether there were alternative forms of tax that would be 
less damaging to work effort than high rates of income tax. The Commission produced 
three reports in 1953, 1954 and 1955. Nicholas Kaldor was a member. During this period 
he developed his ideas for an expenditure tax to replace income tax across the board. All 
sources of spending power should be taxed equivalently he argued - the capacity to cash 
assets, rising capital worth and gifts. He failed to persuade his fellow commissioners on 
this or on his proposal for a capital gains tax. (Cmd 9474, 1955). A Memorandum of 
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Dissent that sought to adapt the existing tax structure to one nearer the principles of an 
expenditure tax was written by Kaldor and also signed by George Woodcock (later 
General Secretary of the TUC) and H.L. Bullock. Kaldor (1955) then published a book 
setting out the case for an expenditure tax at some length.  
For a tax to be fair, Kaldor argued, it must take account of peoples’ capacity to 
pay. If someone had a fortune in the bank their capacity to pay income tax was much 
greater than someone who had no reserves. Similarly a capital gain realised in any tax 
period increased that person’s capacity to pay. Kaldor’s preferred tax was one levied on 
all kinds of receipts - wages and salaries, proceeds from the sales of assets, capital gains, 
bequests, gifts and repayment of loans minus long term investments and net saving over 
the year. He also acknowledged that there was a case for taxing both wealth and 
expenditure since:  
 
‘capital and income constitute two distinct though mutually incomparable sources 
of spending power’ ….‘a separate tax on each provides jointly a better yardstick 
of taxable capacity than either form of taxation by itself.’ ….‘some countries, 
notably Sweden, do provide for an annual progressive tax on capital’ (Kaldor 
1955 p33).  
 
Kaldor’s book became a basis for academic discussion of tax policy in the next 
few years (Due 1960). His basic argument and its constituent tax elements were to form 
the main basis of Labour’s tax policy until 1979 (Whiting 2000, chapter 3). However 
convinced insiders on the party’s economic policy committee might have been the 
Labour Party was never sufficiently convinced to make taxing wealth a major plank of 
policy. Part of the reason may lie in the internal debate the party was having about the 
very nature of socialism. How far should socialism be associated with public ownership 
of the means of production or was it about deeper goals such as achieving more equality, 
spreading opportunities and a higher quality of life to all sections of the community?  
Anthony Crosland’s classic attack on traditional Marxist thought within the Labour Party 
(Crosland 1956) was to have profound consequences for the Labour Party’s programme 
on which it was elected in 1964 (Ellison 1994). It is usually remembered for its shift of 
emphasis from a concern with nationalisation to one that gave much more emphasis to 
social policy. What is often forgotten is that Crosland’s famous volume, The Future of 
Socialism, contained two whole chapters on the redistribution of wealth. He advocated a 
‘concerted attack on the mal-distribution of wealth’ and a six point programme that 
included all of Kaldor’s ideas and others, like a land tax. However, for the more Marxist 
left it was still the ownership of capital and the power it brought that was the key to a 
changed society. Taxation of wealth holdings and other means to pay for social welfare 
were not the answer (Brown 1971).     
In the run up to the 1964 election the Labour Party Tax Working Party produced an 
internal report, this time with a long paper by Kaldor setting out the case for an annual 
tax on wealth.  
 
‘We are in favour of an annual Wealth Tax [on the grounds explained by Prof Kaldor 
in RD 677] namely that it is not only income but wealth which represents spending 
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power and that an equitable tax system should take account of both’. (NK 1-17: LP 
RD 742, April 1964)  
 
The committee’s first priority recommendation, however, was to tax capital gains. 
That was included in the 1964 election manifesto and was implemented in 1965. It was 
not until the special circumstances that obtained in 1974 that the party was persuaded to 
include in its manifesto a pledge to tax wealth on an annual basis as part of its deal with 
the TUC where support for the tax was strong. Its absence in previous election pledges or 
prior major public discussion, however, meant that there was little preparation for what 
was a significant move – a point to which we return.    
 
The Labour Party Manifesto said:  
   
‘Redistribute income and wealth. We shall introduce an annual Wealth Tax on the 
rich; bring in a new tax on major transfers of personal wealth; heavily tax 
speculation in property – including a new tax on property companies’.     
(Labour Party Manifesto 1974) 
 
But just as the Labour Party had become converted to the principle of an annual tax on 
wealth the idea was attracting critics not just from the City and traditional Conservative 
opinion but also from those who were sympathetic to some kind of redistribution of 
wealth (Sandford 1971; Atkinson 1972).     
 
The most comprehensive account of wealth distribution at the time was that by 
(Atkinson 1972).  He agreed with Kaldor that there were both efficiency and equity 
grounds for taxing wealth but he concluded, like Sandford, that the administrative costs 
and difficulty of measuring individuals’ wealth annually for tax purposes made it 
impractical. It would be better to tax those who received transfers of wealth.  
 
‘The life time capital receipts tax would be the most effective way in which 
wealth-transfer taxation could contribute towards bringing about greater equality 
in inherited wealth. Most importantly it would provide a clear incentive for 
donors to spread their wealth widely.’ (p184)   
 
Perhaps because new ideas take time to take root, perhaps because it would have been 
difficult to change the trade unions’ established policy stance so late in the day, perhaps 
because the authors were young newcomers, like Atkinson, or outside the Labour policy 
community like Sandford, the Labour Party did not take up this idea. It did press ahead 
with a Capital Transfer Tax which taxed the giver, the tax rate increasing with the level 
of gifts over a lifetime. Simultaneously the government machine began work on how to 
tax individuals’ total wealth on an annual basis as the Labour Manifesto had promised.   
 
A favourable initial response  
The Inland Revenue had been alert to the possibility that Labour might want to 
introduce a wealth tax as early as 1963 when its first recorded notes on the topic 
discussed what administration and staffing might be needed to implement it. (The 
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National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew. IR40/18573).  This work was taken 
further in preparation for what was thought to be the likely return of a Labour 
Government in 1970.  The Revenue returned to the issue briefly in 1972. But then in 
early 1974, with the Labour Party’s clear commitment to such a tax, a major brief was 
written, drawing on the earlier work. It was to await an incoming Labour Chancellor. It 
was on Denis Healey’s desk by early March 1974.  
The brief discussed what wealth should be included, the thresholds at which the 
tax could begin to be levied and possible dangers like avoidance and capital flight.  But 
the overall content of the memo was very positive. It concluded that such a tax was 
feasible and that the government should move quickly to implement it so as to limit 
capital flight and avoidance. The number of civil servants it would involve and how 
many regional offices would be needed were all included. A timetable was suggested - a 
Green Paper by July 1974, a decision by November and inclusion in the Finance Act 
1975.  
The brief did question the suggestion the Labour Party had made in opposition 
that the top rate of tax could be as high as 5% a year. In combination with other taxes the 
paper pointed out, this would involve a very high marginal rate of tax compared to an 
individual’s income in any one year. It was well above wealth tax levels then in operation 
in other European countries. But the paper concluded:  
 
‘The main purpose of this minute has been to let the Chancellor know that 
although there will of course be many problems to be resolved we see no reason 
why a wealth tax should not be introduced reasonably quickly.’ (TNA: PRO. 
IR40/18573) 
 
Healey was delighted and congratulated the Revenue. The paper, however, included what 
turned out to be a critical suggestion.  
 
‘ The Chancellor may also wish to consider the possibility of having the structure 
of the tax (as opposed to the desirability of introducing it) examined by a Select 
Committee  [of the House of Commons] as for example on Corporation Tax in 
1971 and on Tax Credit in 1972’.  
 
This was a reasonable idea in some ways, opening the policy to wider scrutiny of 
the technical issues, but it was also politically naïve. The forum chosen was bound to 
provoke objections to the very principle from the Conservative members and gave them 
the capacity to delay matters whatever the technical issues. The Chancellor did not 
respond to the select committee suggestion but did take up the idea of a Green Paper and 
accepted the provisional time table. The Revenue set to work to prepare a Green Paper 
for publication in June/July 1974, though in the end it was delayed until August (Cmnd 
5704, 1974). The likely timing for legislation was inclusion in the 1975 Finance Act with 
the first valuations of wealth to take place at the end of that year. The first wealth tax 
returns would be filed after April 1976. [TNA: PRO. IR 40/18573]  
It is interesting that this paper did refer to the criticisms that Prof Sandford (1973) 
and colleagues at the new Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) had made of the Labour 
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Party’s proposals the previous autumn. Like Atkinson they had argued that a tax on 
receipts of major gifts would be preferable.  
The Revenue’s response to this idea is instructive. The Revenue agreed that ‘changes on 
these lines would go a long way to remove major concentrations of wealth’. But they 
argued that it would produce much less revenue. People would give away their wealth in 
small packets to family or to charities. This might redistribute wealth, the paper 
conceded, but it would not raise the government much money. Perhaps this view is not 
surprising. Raising revenue was after all the Revenue’s job! But given that the major 
thrust of the Labour Manifesto had been to reduce wealth inequality that objective was 
surprisingly lightly dismissed. In their defence the Revenue could reasonably argue that 
the Manifesto had been quite clear. The government was to implement an annual wealth 
tax not an ‘accessions tax’, as the tax on receipts came to be called. It was also pressing 
ahead with the Capital Transfer, or gifts tax, that would tax transfers made over a lifetime 
not received by the giver but made by the donor.        
There was little Treasury input at this time. It clearly thought of the issue as a 
technical Revenue responsibility. In short, the early civil service reaction was 
workmanlike and favourable to getting on with the job. The Government needed more 
revenue and this was one way the elected representatives had decided to gather it.    
 
Doubts begin 
From this point on, April 1974, however, the Treasury began to become more and more 
sceptical. Civil servants began to look more carefully at the practical problems and the 
wider economic impact. Opposition from external interests’ began to emerge. 
Representations were made to the Treasury by the National Farmers’ Union, various 
bodies representing the owners of country houses, small businesses, the City, and the 
Bank of England. These mostly received polite brush offs and reassurance. But 
opposition to both the Capital Transfer Tax and the Wealth Tax from the owners of 
country houses and the museums and the art world did prompt a rethink of the treatment 
of such property as ‘national treasures’. A successful campaign was launched that 
attracted a million signatures in defence of the English country house (Mandler 1997; see 
also House of Lords debate Hansard 26th June 1974).    
It was other matters that really worried the Treasury. The weakness of the 
economy, rising inflation and the threat to sterling increasingly engaged civil servants 
until it dominated almost everything they considered (Wass 2008). An internal note dated 
20th May 1974 was entitled ‘Wealth Tax – possible exodus of UK capital.’ (TNA: PRO 
T328/1017.)  Harold Lever, Harold Wilson’s advisor on financial matters, wrote to the 
Prime Minister on 7th June putting the Wealth Tax in the context of other things the 
government were trying to do.  
‘We are now running a serious risk of a crisis of confidence in the business world 
- inflation, price controls, a fall in real assets…,’ all coming together. 
‘The Green Paper on a wealth tax will make a crucial impact on confidence- it 
will be almost a touch stone of our attitude towards enterprise and wealth.’(TNA: 
PRO T 328/1018) 
In a later note he says: 
‘This Green Paper is political dynamite….as we are breaking what for us is very 
new ground we will have less trouble if we give Parliament an opportunity of 
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looking at our proposals in detail before legislation….. Any resultant delay in 
legislation is I believe tolerable if it leads to a more acceptable and workable 
scheme’. 
Kaldor, however, thought a Select Committee at best would be ‘pointless.’ Worse, it 
would result in the loss of political momentum. (TNA: PRO T328/1019) 
 
Treasury worries come to a head.  
Treasury concern grew. A note on 1st July to the Permanent Secretary expressed concern 
at the weight that a whole range of measures might have on ‘confidence’. They included 
the nationalisation of shipbuilding, and aerospace, a ‘large stake’ in the top 100 firms, 
large public spending commitments as well as the wealth tax.  
The possibility of a negative income tax, long term pension reform, benefits to single 
parents and a ‘family endowment’ scheme were ‘cumulatively very expensive’. There 
was also community ownership of development land on the agenda. ‘If confidence is still 
in a jittery state the sheer volume of announcements in the next few weeks could have a 
depressing effect’.  (TNA: PRO T328/1020)  
So at a meeting on 10 July 1974 of the Chancellor, all the other Treasury 
ministers and senior officials it was agreed that everyone was broadly content with the 
Green Paper. But there was “a problem of timing”. It was agreed to put off publication 
until mid August before the Chancellor’s holiday and after the House of Commons 
economic debate. Crucially there was “general support for asking for a Select Committee 
to look at the WT.” (TNA: PRO T328/1021) 
The draft was to go to the Cabinet sub committee on Economic Strategy at the 
end of July. The aim was to publish the White Paper on the Capital Transfer (Gift) Tax 
and the Wealth Tax Green Paper on the same day - 8 Aug 1974.  
The Green Paper went to the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Economic 
Strategy on 29 July. (TNA: PRO T328/ 1022) At this meeting, which for the first time 
involved non Treasury ministers in the discussion, there was disappointment that there 
would not be legislation before 1976. The Select Committee route might be undesirable 
other ministers suggested. It would be better to have a White Paper and get the views of 
the House in debate not delay with a Select Committee. But this view did not prevail.   
This was to be the high tide of optimism about implementing the tax. From then 
on the government lost the initiative and the argument. The Treasury had won a crucial 
delay. Kaldor’s fears about the Select Committee were fully justified. The Conservative 
members opposed, obstructed and delayed. They mounted a formidable attack on the very 
idea. Academics who thought this was not the way to tax wealth and the range of lobbies 
who opposed it in principle dominated discussion and the presentation of evidence. The 
Committee’s expert advisor Professor Willis was one of the IFS authors who had been 
critical of an annual tax (Sandford, Willis and Ironside 1973). Certainly the advocates of 
such a tax never put together a convincing riposte to the barrage of criticism the hearings 
provoked (HC 696 I and II 1974/5).       
 
The Treasury’s internal rethink 
The committee process had brought all the Treasury’s doubts to a head. It had forced 
those affected to marshal their arguments. It had provided a platform for the critics and 
tested the strength of the government’s case especially on the form the tax was to take. 
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The critics who favoured a different way to tax wealth were able to expand on their view 
and get a much wider audience. It had also forced the Treasury to confront the detail in 
preparing briefs for the committee and to answer the critics’ case.     
The old worry that such a tax would provoke a capital flight, and be a danger to the core 
activities of the City, had been reinforced. It had done so at a time of growing pressure on 
the pound. One paper, after reviewing the likely impact of the tax, concluded that a 
wealth tax:   
 
‘1. Will lead people to seek non resident status, result in a considerable 
outflow of funds in the form of dividends and interest. 
2. Since it will apply to all wealth held world wide foreign employees in 
foreign companies resident here would be subject to tax. This would result in a 
big movement of banks, insurance and shipping business moving out of the UK. 
3. Assets held here would be affected. This would reduce the level of 
business in UK.’ (TNA: PRO T328/1249)  
 
There was a meeting of those civil servants most involved with the Permanent 
Secretary. There were no politicians or outside advisers present. (TNA: PRO T328/1252) 
The minutes were marked ‘secret’. They concluded that the tax would produce little 
revenue, be extremely difficult to administer and risk serious damage to the economy and 
run into serious opposition.  It was agreed that the Chancellor should be approached. In 
its advice the Treasury said:  
 
‘We would of course seek to minimise these difficulties..but…the present prospect is 
another rough ride for ministers with criticism outweighing support’. (TNA; PRO 
T328/1252)  
 
The Chancellor agreed he would speak to the Prime Minister. On the 2nd July 1975 a 
briefing note was written for the Chancellor who was to see the Prime Minister and 
propose that the legislation for a wealth tax be postponed until 1977 (TNA: PRO 
T328/1253). The Chancellor saw Wilson the Prime Minister on the 26th July (TNA: PRO 
T328/1254) and a postponement was agreed.  
 
Over the next year little advance was made on the details. The battle over cuts in public 
spending and the IMF loan took over the Treasury’s concerns. A new Prime Minister 
Callaghan was in office. He had steered the cuts through a divided Cabinet. There was 
some worry about the likely impact a decision to abandon the tax would have on the 
unions. One civil servant wrote to his superior to question how the TUC might react. By 
implication the question was - how are we going to get them to agree to contain wage 
rises if we have not kept to our side of the bargain? His superior sent the memo back with 
a hand written note on it:  
  
‘Let us cross this bridge when we come to it. We have won a battle for 
“efficiency” not the war’. (memo from R. Fox with this penned response from 
Alan Lord  TNA: PRO T336/108) 
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In the event it was concern about the markets’ reaction to a white paper that trumped 
concern about the TUC. 
    
‘Our economic and financial management is now under more critical international 
scrutiny. There is a risk that the issue of a White Paper foreshadowing a WT 
would look irrelevant and unnecessarily provocative.’  (A note to the Chancellor 
10 June 1976 TNA: PRO T366/108) 
 
On 21st June the Chancellor wrote to the Prime Minister saying they should not publish a 
white paper at all - effectively abandoning the whole idea. Harold Lever wrote to the 
Prime Minister PM (24th June) strongly supporting that view. The matter was put to the 
‘EY Cabinet Committee’ for decision. It concurred. (TNA: PRO T366/108)  
  
A written answer appeared in Hansard 29 Nov 1976 announcing that the 
government would ‘not introduce a wealth tax in the life of this parliament’. 
(Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Written Answers, 29 November 1976.)   
 
The Treasury tax group wrote a long retrospective brief on what had gone wrong (TNA: 
PRO T366/108). It began with a discussion of the key confusion or conflict of objectives 
that had dogged the project from the outset, as they saw it. There were two different and 
confused objectives the paper concluded:  
• To achieve equity between taxpayers with and without wealth – the unequal 
capacity to pay argument.  
• To achieve equity in wealth holdings - the redistribution of wealth. They quoted 
Healey’s introduction to the Green Paper that suggested this was the key goal. But 
the scale of taxation needed to do this had never been faced up to by politicians 
the note argued.    
• Moreover, that goal was already being achieved by what seemed to be the natural 
process of economic change and the existing taxes on wealth.  This would be 
especially true after the introduction of the Capital Transfer Tax.   
 
This last conclusion drew on previous Treasury work that had estimated that the share 
of wealth owned by the top one per cent had fallen substantially over the century and 
would continue to fall even without a wealth tax. The first observation has been 
confirmed by later research (Feinstein 1996). The latter prediction has not.    
 
Lessons  
  
Two different sets of questions arise. The first concerns the substance of the policy in 
question. Was the attempt to tax wealth on an annual basis simply the wrong way to 
approach the problem of moderating unequal wealth?  Was a better way on offer and 
ignored? If so why? What should those concerned with the growing concentration of 
wealth learn from this experience?  
A second set of questions concerns the process of social policy making. Have we given 
sufficient attention to the role of the civil service in the policy process? Did the Treasury 
merely perform the constitutional task expected of it? Did it save the country from a 
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foolish policy? Was it an example of ‘policy success’ as one reviewer of this paper put it? 
Or does this glimpse into the inner workings of government suggest that the barriers to 
radical change are higher than many in the social policy community are prepared to 
recognise?  
It is appropriate to begin with the narrower policy question first – was the tax a mistake?  
 
Denis Healey’s own reflective conclusion was that it was a mistake. 
 
‘Another lesson was that you should never commit yourself in Opposition to new 
taxes unless you have a very good idea how they will operate in practice. We had 
committed ourselves to a Wealth Tax: but in five years I found it impossible to 
draft one which would yield enough revenue to be worth the administrative cost 
and political hassle.’ (Healey 1989, p404)   
 
It seems clear that the Labour Party never considered in any detail the administrative 
costs and practical complications involved in assessing individuals’ wealth on a regular 
basis. It was enough to say, as Labour Party Research Department papers did, that other 
countries levied such taxes so it must be possible. The several thousand civil servants 
needed, depending on the valuation level at which the tax began, the numerous regional 
offices required and the process of regular valuation that might fall on individuals came 
as a surprise to the politicians and, indeed, to the Treasury when it got to think about the 
question properly.  
European taxes had been introduced when the main form of wealth was in the form of 
property. The taxes were very low. The attempt to introduce a much more onerous one 
ran into difficulty in Norway. But only a few years after the Treasury had concluded such 
an annual tax was administratively unworkable a rather similar ‘Solidarity Tax’ was 
introduced in France under President Mitterand. Administrative obstacles depend, in no 
small measure, on political traditions and notions of ‘acceptability’.         
The administrative issues had, however, been discussed and to some extent quantified by 
Atkinson (1972) and Sandford (1971). Their alternative was to tax recipients and to do so 
as an extension of the income tax system. Why did this not feature in the Labour Party’s 
discussion? The most likely answer is that these ideas were relatively new and those 
advancing them were removed from, or new to, the Labour policy fraternity. The Institute 
for Fiscal Studies to which some of the critics belonged was a recent creation and carried 
nothing like its later authority. The Labour Party had been discussing a wealth tax for 
many years, from 1959, in fact. It was part of the party policy intellectual furniture even 
if not widely discussed in public. Taking on new policy ideas from relative outsiders at 
all quickly was not something to which the party policy making apparatus was well 
adapted.   
When the idea of an accessions tax was discussed by the civil service the Inland Revenue 
dismissed it because they thought it would encourage the spreading of gifts and hence 
produce little revenue. The government did successfully press ahead with a Capital 
Transfer Tax (a gifts tax) levied on large gifts collected from the giver. It was later 
repealed by the next Conservative Government.  
The idea of taxing the recipients of significant transfers of wealth has been advanced 
again as part of the Mirrlees Review of the UK tax system. (Mirrlees Review 2011; 
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Boadway, Chamberlain and Emmerson 2010). One lesson to be drawn from the 1974 
experience is that the administrative detail in taxation matters a lot. The idea still lacks 
detailed study. The second lesson is that tax changes that are likely to affect major 
sections of the population and the wider economy have to be widely debated before, 
rather than after, any party reaches power. The attempt to introduce a wealth tax in 1974 
was not preceded by any such process. It had been discussed in party committees and 
academic papers for more than a decade. The public case had never been argued through. 
It fell at the ‘there is a widely perceived problem’ phase of policy making (Kingdon 
1984). As the Treasury pointed out the distribution of wealth had been quietly becoming 
more equal over most of the century. Beyond the moderate left and those on the TUC it 
was not seen as a pressing social issue. Thus, even if a more effective, less costly, means 
of taxation had been under discussion, the accessions tax, it, too, might have fallen at the 
same hurdle.  
If any new move to tax wealth is to be successful it will only be so if the public, many of 
whom are now holders of modest wealth, are convinced that its unequal distribution is ‘a 
problem’.  
This leads on to a more fundamental question. How far is any radical change in the 
pattern of economic rewards feasible in a modern mobile interdependent economy? The 
archives show how much this exercised the Treasury in 1974 long before capital, human 
and financial, was as mobile as it is today. The Treasury concerns went far beyond 
technical worries about the costs of collection.  
Most analysis of the Treasury’s part in social policy has been concerned with its role as 
guardian of the public purse and micro economic issues such as the impact of social 
security or education and training on labour market efficiency (Heclo and Wildavsky 
1974; Deakin and Parry 2000). Harris (1977) described the Treasury’s part in containing 
Beveridge’s ambitions. Lowe (1989; 1997) showed how its attempts to contain social 
spending were frustrated in the 1950s and how it responded. This study gives a glimpse 
of the Treasury’s deeper concern – defending a mixed economy from the perceived 
destructive effects of major changes to the distribution of income and wealth. These may 
have, or be perceived to have, an impact on the overall efficiency and stability of the 
economy. Its role as ‘guardian of the economic order’, which we see itself consciously 
adopting between 1974 and 1979, has been left to civil servants like Sir Douglass Wass 
(2008) to describe. Here we see it played out in detail over tax policy.    
It is possible, of course, to interpret these actions in quite a different way. The 
Treasury, Marxist historians would argue, is the quintessential defender of the economic 
order in a state apparatus that defends the status quo. As Ralph Miliband put it:  
 
‘the dominant economic interests in capitalist society can normally count 
on the active good will and support of those in whose hands state power 
lies.’ (Miliband 1969 p 145).  
 
However interpreted the political limits to fundamental change in the distribution of 
wealth and income are perhaps more powerful than many social policy reformers are 
ready to accept. The debates of the 1950s and 1960s do suggest that there is an efficiency 
case to be advanced for taxing wealth in some way. Wealth and income are 
interchangeable and high taxes on income undesirable. The argument has been extended 
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by the Mirrlees Review (2011). But any tax on wealth would challenge established 
interests, not least many home owners, be argued to weaken incentives to save, to found 
small businesses or cause capital flight. There will be administrative complications. 
Unless these fears are effectively answered a repeat of the 1974-6 saga is all too likely.  
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